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     he United States dramatically raised the profile of cyberspace operations 
as a method of warfare when it announced the establishment of the United 
States Cyber Command in June, 2009.1 As a sub-unified command of the 
United States Strategic Command and led by a four-star general, who also 
serves as the Director, National Security Agency, Cyber Command ab-
sorbed the responsibilities of two separate, lower-profile organizations: 
Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and Joint Func-
tional Component Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW).2  
                                                                                                                      
* Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy; Deputy Director, Office 
of the Judge Advocate General's Information Operations (Cyber) and Intelligence Law 
Division. The views expressed here are Commander Walker's personal opinion and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the 
Navy, the Naval War College or United States Cyber Command. 
1. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to Secretaries of the 
Military Departments et. al, Establishment of a Subordinate Unified U.S. Cyber Command 
Under U.S. Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations 1 (June, 23, 2009), 
available at http://fcw.com/~/media/GIG/GCN/Documents/cyber%20command% 
20gates%20memo.ashx. 












There were a number of reasons for creating Cyber Command. First, 
bringing together JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW eliminated deficiencies and 
gaps between those operating Department of Defense (DoD) networks 
and those charged with defending the same networks.3 Second, the newly 
realized efficiencies would result in an increased ability to support global 
missions with cyberspace operations.4 Finally, deficiencies and gaps in 
DoD’s cybersecurity efforts were identified in response to specific intru-
sion events into DoD networks.5 Operation Buckshot Yankee, the DoD 
response to “the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever” 
in 2008, was a key impetus to the standup of Cyber Command, according 
to then-Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn.6 Although Cyber 
Command will “integrate cyberdefense operations across the military”7 
through its mission to “direct the operations and defense of specified De-
partment of Defense information networks,”8 the command also has the 
responsibility for conducting offensive operations in cyberspace.9 
In the ensuing three years, Cyber Command reached full operational 
capability on October 31, 2010.10 As that occurred, countries around the 
world established or announced plans to create their own cyberspace 
commands. Some, such as China, India and Russia, apparently tied the cre-
ation of their units directly to the creation of Cyber Command.11 Like the 
United States, other countries are establishing such a unit in response to 
                                                                                                                      
3. Conference Brief, Cyber War and International Law, Panel I: An Introduction to 
Cyber Operations 1 (remarks of Colonel Ron Reed, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)), 
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/97cfcf32-5007-4b2c-b1a8-8fb7b8cd2e4f/ILD-Co 
nference-Brief-2012.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
4. Id. at 1–2 (remarks of Captain Timothy J. White, U.S. Navy). 
5. Id. at 1. 
6. William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 
97. 
7. Id. 
8. Fact Sheet, United States Strategic Command, U.S. Cyber Com-
mand (Dec. 2011), http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/. 
9. See id. The third mission assigned to Cyber Command is “when directed, conducts 
full-spectrum military cyberspace operations.” 
10. Id. 
11. See Tania Branigan, Chinese Army to Target Cyber War Threat, GUARDIAN (London) 
(July 22, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/22/chinese-army-
cyber-war-department); Harish Gupta, India Setting Up Cyber Command, MSN NEWS (May 
15, 2011, 6:51 PM), http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-documentid 
=5160226#page=1; Vice Prime Minister Rogozin Pledges to Set Up Cyber Command in Russia, 














external threats. In the case of South Korea, the threat is cyber actions em-
anating from North Korea.12 For Iran, the decision to create a cyber com-
mand came a year after the world learned about the Stuxnet virus, which 
caused damage to nearly one thousand centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear 
facility.13 Still other States had cyberspace operations units that predated 
the creation of Cyber Command, but whose existence only became public 
in the years following Cyber Command’s establishment. Germany and the 
United Kingdom are two such examples.14  
These are just the most prominent examples of States that have taken 
or are preparing to take such a step. There are undoubtedly others who 
have created such units in greater secrecy or whose action went unnoticed 
by the Western media. As more and more States create computer network 
operations or cyber command units, it is appropriate to examine the inter-
national law implications for how such units should be organized to con-
duct operations given the unique nature of cyberspace as an operating do-
main.  
This article examines three areas of the law of armed conflict with im-
plications for the organization and execution of cyberspace operations. Of 
necessity, given the little information that is available from most States with 
respect to cyberspace operations and the prominence of the Cyber Com-
mand, these areas will be examined through the prism of DoD practices. 
Part II examines the issue of reviewing cyberspace weapons for compliance 
with the law of armed conflict, comparing and contrasting the practices of 
the services that comprise the U.S. armed forces. Part III addresses the is-
sues that occur in organizing for cyberspace operations raised by the re-
quirement to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Specifically, the 
section will examine the feasibility of clearly separating military objects and 
objectives from civilian objects in cyberspace. Part IV extends the discus-
sion of precautions against the effect of cyber attacks to a State’s conduct 
                                                                                                                      
12. See Jung Sung Ki, Cyber Warfare Command to be Launched in January, KOREA TIMES 
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/12/205_56502. 
html (describing suspicions that North Korea was behind massive distributed denial of 
service attacks occurring against government and industrial sites earlier in the year). 
13 Iran to Launch First Cyber Command, PRESSTV (Mar. 25, 2012, 6:02 PM), http:// 
presstv.com/detail/184774.html.  
14 John Leyden, Germany Reveals Secret Techie Soldier Unit, New Cyberweapons, THE REG-
ISTER (June 8, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/06/08/germany_ 
cyber_offensive_capability/; Colin Clark Monday, Stratcom Plows Ahead on Cyber, DOD 













of its own cyber attacks, examining principles implicit in the interaction 
between a number of customary rules within the law of armed conflict to 
arrive at an explicit conclusion as to how States should organize and pre-
pare for conducting cyber attacks.   
 
II. WEAPONS REVIEWS 
 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I obligates States that develop, acquire or 
adopt “a new weapon, means or method of warfare . . . to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibit-
ed” by the law of armed conflict.15 The determination is to be made in the 
course of the acquisition or development of the weapon, means or method 
of warfare in order to ensure it can be employed within the law of armed 
conflict.16 The rule recognizes the practicality of ensuring that a new weap-
on, means or method of warfare can be legally used before a State expends 
the often-considerable expense of procuring it.  
Of course, it may not be apparent at that early stage whether the weap-
on will actually be employed as it was intended to be used during the 
course of its development. In addition, prohibitions on a weapon’s use may 
be factually dependent and not all of those situations may be foreseeable 
during a legal review that occurs during the course of acquisition or devel-
opment. Thus, in order to meet the requirement of examining the weapons 
legality “in some or all circumstances,”17 it may be necessary to conduct 
more than one legal review of the weapon, not only during acquisition or 
development, but also prior to employment of the weapon by a State’s op-
erational forces.18   
Neither Article 36 nor the Commentary on Additional Protocol I define 
what is meant by the term “weapon, means or method of warfare.” In fact, 
                                                                                                                      
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, International Law 
in Cyberspace, Keynote Address at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference 4 
(Sept. 18, 2012) (transcript on file with author). (“The U.S. Government undertakes at 
least two stages of legal review of the use of weapons in the context of armed conflict—
first, an evaluation of new weapons to determine whether their use would be per se prohib-
ited by the law of war; and second, specific operations employing weapons are always re-













the Commentary only uses the term “weapon” and does not address poten-
tial differences, if any, between a weapon and the ostensibly broader 
“means or method of warfare.”19 If one considers that the purposes of the 
law of armed conflict are to prevent unnecessary suffering to both combat-
ants and noncombatants, as well as to prevent harm to civilians and civilian 
objects from attacks, weapons are the devices that are used in attacks to 
cause such suffering. Unlike “weapon,” there is a definition of “attack” as 
an “act of violence, whether in offence or defense,” contained in Article 49 
of Additional Protocol I.20 Given the uncertain application of the law of 
armed conflict in the cyber domain, recent scholarship has focused on the 
question of what the definition of “attack” means by way of resulting ef-
fects or consequences.21 The emerging consensus is that for a military ac-
tion, whether it occurs in cyberspace or not, to be considered an “attack,” 
it must result in a violent consequence such as death, injury, or physical 
damage to property.22 Weapons, then, are the devices used in attacks that 
cause the deaths, injuries or damage to property. As will be seen, this view 
is consistent with the definitions of “weapon” used by the armed forces of 
the United States.  
U.S. practice is to conduct multiple legal reviews of weapons in order 
to meet the requirements of customary international law as reflected in Ar-
ticle 36. The first review is “an evaluation of new weapons to determine 
whether their use would be per se prohibited by the law of war.”23 In U.S. 
practice, this acquisition weapons review is generally conducted by the ser-
vice—Army; Navy, including the Marine Corps; or Air Force—that is pro-
                                                                                                                      
19. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 1463–1482 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
20. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 49. 
21. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89, 94 (Raul A. “Pete” 
Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College Interna-
tional Law Studies) (“A cyber operation, like any other operation, is an attack when result-
ing in death or injury of individuals, whether civilians or combatants, or damage to or de-
struction of objects, whether military objectives or civilian objects.”); Paul A. Walker, Re-
thinking Computer Network “Attack”: Implications for Law and U.S. Doctrine, 1 NATIONAL SE-
CURITY LAW BRIEF 33, 47 (2010). 
22. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR-
FARE rule 30 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013), (“A cyber attack is a cyber operation, wheth-
er offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons 
or damage or destruction to objects.”) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. 












curing the weapon. Once a determination is made to employ a weapon, the 
operation is reviewed to ensure that, in the specific factual context, the 
weapon’s use complies with the law of armed conflict.24 This second review 
is completed by the unit employing the weapon. For U.S. military cyber-
space operations, that unit is currently Cyber Command.  
The acquisition review requirement is formally established in Depart-
ment of Defense Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” 
which vaguely states “[t]he acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons 
and weapon systems shall be consistent with all applicable domestic law 
and treaties and international agreements . . . customary international law, 
and the law of armed conflict.”25 With respect to cyber weapons, this re-
quirement has been implemented differently by each of the Services. In 
2011, the Air Force rewrote its instruction to require not only legal reviews 
of “weapons,” but also legal reviews of “cyber capabilities,” which are 
broadly defined to include almost any effect created in cyberspace, not just 
the types of effects (death and injury to persons and damage to property) 
caused by weapons.26 The naval service (Navy and Marine Corps) also re-
vised its acquisition instruction in 2011, but did not similarly single out 
cyber capabilities. Instead, the Navy guidance defines weapons that must 
undergo legal review as items “that are intended to have an effect of injur-
ing, damaging, destroying, or disabling personnel or property, to include 
non-lethal weapons.”27 The Army’s instruction is older, being last revised in 
1979. It also focuses on items that have “an intended effect of injuring, de-
stroying, or disabling enemy personnel, materiel, or property” as weapons.28 
Army practice has been to conduct acquisition legal reviews of cyber capa-
bilities if one is requested, but not as a matter of course. Given that the Air 
                                                                                                                      
24. Id. 
25. Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition 
System encl. 1, ¶E1.1.15 (2003, current through Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www. 
dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p.pdf. 
26. Secretary, Department of the Air Force, AFI 51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons 
and Cyber Capabilities (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi51-
402.pdf [hereinafter AFI 51-402]. 
27. Under Secretary of the Navy, SECNAVINST 5000.2E, Department of the Navy 
Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabili-
ties Integration and Development System ¶ 1.6.1.c (2012), available at http://www.acquis 
ition.navy.mil/ content/download/7754/35836/.../5000+2e.pdf. 
28. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 27-53, Review of Le-
gality of Weapons Under International Law ¶ 3.a, Jan. 1, 1979, available at http://www. 













Force instruction is the only one to single out cyber capabilities, it is in-
structive to examine that guidance in more detail. 
First, it is important to understand that the Air Force instruction does 
define “weapons” in a manner similar to the other Services: “devices de-
signed to kill, injure, disable or temporarily incapacitate people, or destroy, 
damage or temporarily incapacitate property or materiel.”29 It then goes on 
to separately define “cyber capability” as “any device or software payload 
intended to disrupt, deny, degrade, negate, impair or destroy adversarial 
computer systems, data, activities or capabilities.”30 The only exception to 
the breadth of this definition is a “device or software that is solely intended 
to provide access to an adversarial computer system for data exploita-
tion.”31 Otherwise, the full review procedures provided in the instruction 
apply equally to both weapons and cyber capabilities, including any and all 
modifications to those weapons and cyber capabilities. Thus the Air Force 
instruction meets the requirements of Article 36 by basically requiring the 
same type of review for the same types of weapons as the other Services. 
The guidance to also review cyber capabilities is not required by Article 36, 
but is a policy choice made by the Air Force. Of course, nothing in the law 
of armed conflict prohibits States from doing more than the minimum re-
quired by those laws. In this case, however, the additional review require-
ments do very little to advance the purposes of the law of armed conflict 
and, in fact, result in misapplying its principles. In addition, by not limiting 
the legal review to those cyber capabilities that are intended to cause de-
struction of property, deaths or injuries, the over-inclusive definition un-
necessarily impedes operations, particularly given the Air Force require-
ment to conduct a new legal review for any modification of a cyber capabil-
ity. 
As discussed earlier, weapons reviews are conducted to ensure they do 
not violate prohibitions against unnecessary suffering to combatants and 
noncombatants, as well as ensuring that the use of the weapon does not 
result in indiscriminate attacks on civilians or civilian objects, this latter 
purpose is embodied in the principle of distinction. The problem with the 
Air Force approach to having all cyber capabilities reviewed is that most of 
the capabilities acquired will not have the effect or intent of causing any 
human suffering, much less death or injury. Other than the possible de-
struction of adversary computer systems, the other types of capabilities that 
                                                                                                                      














must be reviewed—those that disrupt, deny, degrade, negate or impair 
computer systems, data, activities or capabilities—in most cases, if not all, 
will have little to no destructive impact on property. Where there is no in-
tent or ability for the cyber capability to produce the same effects as a 
weapon used during an attack, then the legal review becomes a needless 
exercise in paper production.  
From an operational perspective, such unnecessary administrative re-
quirements impede the ability to conduct operations in a timely manner, 
particularly in the area of cyberspace operations where exhortations to 
move at “net speed” predominate. As a policy matter, it is understandable 
to place an excess of caution into this developing area and, ideally, opera-
tional impacts of extra review requirements are limited when the reviews 
occur during the acquisition process prior to procurement and deployment 
to or by operational forces. Unfortunately, the Air Force instruction does 
not mitigate the operational impact, but, instead, exacerbates them by re-
quiring that cyber capabilities that are modified must undergo a new legal 
review.32 This new review must be performed within Air Force channels, 
even if the capability has been operationally deployed. The instruction also 
does not provide a de minimus exception that would permit minor altera-
tions to go unreviewed, even if the alteration does not change the effects to 
be delivered by the capability in any way. This is a real problem for the 
conduct of operations. Unlike kinetic weapons, cyber capabilities are rou-
tinely modified during the course of employment to account for changes in 
the operational environment, new versions of operating systems, software 
updates, changes to anti-virus software, and installation or updating of sys-
tem firewalls. These types of alterations or modifications, where there is no 
change to what the capability does, are best left to the operational legal re-
view prior to employment, rather than reinserting them into the acquisition 
process.  
For States organizing for cyberspace operations, an examination of U.S. 
practice demonstrates the best way to comply with the requirement to con-
duct legal reviews of new weapons. Cyber capabilities should only undergo 
a legal review as a “new weapon” when the cyber capability is developed 
with the expectation or intent that its use will result in death, injuries, or 
damage or destruction of property. This is consistent with current practice 
with respect to kinetic weapons and is the approach taken by the U.S. Ar-
my and the naval service. The law of armed conflict does not require legal 
                                                                                                                      













reviews of all new, and newly-modified, cyber capabilities, as is the current 
Air Force practice. Instead, cyber capabilities whose use is not expected or 
intended to result in death, injuries or damage to property should only be 
subjected to a legal review at the time they are employed as part of the legal 
review undertaken to ensure that the operation as a whole complies with 
the law of armed conflict. 
 
III. PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF ATTACKS 
 
When preparing to conduct cyberspace operations, States need to be cog-
nizant of the obligations that the law of armed conflict imposes with re-
spect to protections for the State’s own populace. Applying these obliga-
tions in cyberspace operations yields different outcomes than those that 
result from preparing for kinetic operations. Instead of focusing on physi-
cal separation of civilians and civilian objects, States that undertake cyber-
space operations may need to focus on conducting these operations in such 
a way that civilian cyber objects are not mistaken by potential adversaries 
for the State’s own cyber military objects and objectives.  
The general obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks 
occurring within a State’s own territory is contained in Article 58 of Addi-
tional Protocol I and is written in distinctly “kinetic” terms. It is a three-
part obligation that involves “remov[ing] . . . civilians and civilian objects . . 
. from the vicinity of military objectives”;33 not “locating military objectives 
within or near densely populated areas”;34 and taking “other necessary pre-
cautions to protect . . . civilians and civilian objects . . . against the dangers 
resulting from military operations.”35 Of these three, the easiest one to ap-
ply directly to cyberspace operations on its own terms is the third one, to 
take necessary precautions to protect against the dangers resulting from 
military operations. In the kinetic sense, the commentary on this article 
makes clear that, when drafted, this portion of the article referred to a 
State’s provision of civil defense measures for its population, such as bomb 
shelters.36 The commentary also discusses a State’s provision of civil de-
fense services and the training and equipping of civil defense forces. In the 
context of cyberspace operations, cybersecurity measures undertaken by a 
State to protect civilian cyber infrastructure are equivalent to the types of 
                                                                                                                      
33. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 58(a). 
34. Id. art. 58(b). 
35. Id. art. 58(c). 












civil defense measures contemplated by sub-paragraph (c) of Article 58. Of 
course, unlike State-sponsored and State-provided civil defense measures, 
there are a multiplicity of means and mechanisms available for undertaking 
cybersecurity measures. What Article 58(c) makes clear, though, is that at 
least to some extent the obligation is a State responsibility and is not some-
thing that can be left solely to the private sector to implement. How such 
measures are to be implemented by States is left to their discretion, but Ar-
ticle 58 makes clear the State’s obligation to do something. 
The other two provisions of Article 58 concern physical separation be-
tween military and civilian objects. This obligation to clearly separate and 
distinguish between civilian objects not subject to attack by an adversary 
and military objects that are properly subject to attack serves to aid in the 
adversary’s ability to adhere to the law of armed conflict principle of dis-
tinction. The obligations contained within Article 58 are not absolute, 
however. Instead, they must be undertaken “to the maximum extent feasi-
ble,” which is described in the Commentary as not being required “to do the 
impossible.” 37 Over time, a consensus has emerged that the feasibility re-
quirement means that States must do what is practicable and are not re-
quired to take steps that are impracticable. The practicality approach is tak-
en by the numerous compilations of customary international law applicable 
to specific warfighting domains, such as the Air and Missile Warfare Manu-
al,38 the San Remo Manual39 and with respect to cyberspace operations, the 
Tallinn Manual.40  
On the flip side of the obligation to segregate military from civilian ob-
jects is a requirement not to intentionally intermingle such objects, particu-
larly if the goal is to use an object’s civilian or other protected status as a 
means of protecting the military object from attack. On this aspect of pre-
cautions against the effects of attacks, the Air and Missile Warfare Manual’s 
discussion of customary international law is explicit: “Belligerent parties 
subject to air or missile attacks must, to the maximum extent feasible, avoid 
locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, hospi-
                                                                                                                      
37. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2245. 
38. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MIS-
SILE WARFARE rule 42 (2010), available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary% 
20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf. 
39. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA ¶ 46.3 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995). 













tals, cultural property, places of worship, prisoner of war camps, and other 
facilities which are entitled to specific protection. . . .”41 Examples of State 
action violating this obligation occurred during the Gulf War to oust Sad-
dam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. The Iraqi Air Force repeatedly re-
moved combat aircraft from airfields and located them next to mosques 
within populated areas. Despite this intentional attempt to shield them 
from bombing, the aircraft remained valid military targets subject to attack, 
with any damage that might occur to the mosque required to be accounted 
for within the proportionality analysis by the attacking State. Although this 
example involves the intentional relocation of a military object next to a 
civilian protected object, the law of armed conflict also prohibits States 
from misusing the protected status of civilian objects during the course of 
attacks. 
The question then becomes, what measures are practicable for States to 
take in separating their military cyber objects from civilian cyber objects. At 
first blush, it may not seem practicable at all given the ubiquitous nature of 
cyberspace. After all, the Internet grew out of a project started by the De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency, with an original intent of 
providing for redundant communication paths. From quite modest begin-
nings has grown a global phenomenon, with most of the supporting infra-
structure in the hands of commercial entities. Cyberspace, the overarching 
term for not just what is known as the Internet, but the interaction of all 
connected networks and systems is heavily used by governments; industry, 
including government contractors; businesses, large and small; and by indi-
vidual citizens of every country. Often, military communications (usually 
heavily encrypted) are traveling with and alongside all these other commu-
nications, particularly across the backbone infrastructures owned by what 
are known in the United States as “Tier 1 Internet Service Providers” and 
their equivalents in other countries.  
At least one commentator who has written extensively in this area has 
declared that in the context of cyberspace operations “segregation of mili-
tary and civilian objects during an armed attack [is] unfeasible.”42 Having 
concluded that it is not possible for States to meet the obligations of Arti-
                                                                                                                      
41. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, HPCR MAN-
UAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE rule 42 (2009) 
[hereinafter AMW MANUAL]. 
42. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 












cle 58(a) and (b),43 his analysis focuses on the Article 58(c) obligations im-
posed on States to take cybersecurity measures to secure their civilian pop-
ulations and companies from the effects of cyber attacks.44 In a similar 
fashion, the newly-published Tallinn Manual’s Rule 59 on “Precautions 
against the Effects of Cyber Attacks” focuses on Article 58(c)’s require-
ment to take precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects from dan-
gers arising from cyber attacks, and does not specifically address the physi-
cal differentiation addressed in Article 58(a) and (b).45 The commentary on 
the Manual’s Rule 59 makes clear that the Group of Experts that authored 
the Manual viewed the obligations of Article 58(a) and (b) as subsumed 
within the rule they crafted.46 In their view, sections (a) and (b) of Addi-
tional Protocol I’s Article 58 are redundant with section (c). The commen-
tary does mention actions such as “segregating military from civilian cyber 
infrastructure,”47 but its only substantive discussion of the concept is to 
make the point that “[i]t may not always be feasible for parties to the con-
flict to segregate potential military objectives from civilian objects.”48 The 
focus of the Tallinn Manual’s commentary on Rule 59 is very much on what 
it characterizes as “passive precautions,”49 rather than the arguably more 
active requirements of the other two sections of Article 58. Omitting a sep-
arate rule emphasizing and discussing the need for States to ensure physical 
separation of military from civilian cyber infrastructure unfortunately 
deemphasizes that aspect of the customary international law requirement to 
take precautions to protect their civilian populations from the effects of 
cyber attacks. Rather than downplaying this requirement, where the risk to 
civilian objects is as prevalent as many assume it is during cyberspace oper-
ations, the better course would have been to provide a number of more 
specific rules addressing these requirements in the specific cyber context. 
This was the approach taken by the Air and Missile Warfare Manual, which 
derived multiple rules addressing physical separation of military targets 
from civilians and civilian objects. 
It is important, though, to differentiate between military cyber objects 
and dual-use objects, such as power plants or air traffic control systems, 
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44. See id. at 1552–55. 
45. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 22, at 146.  
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that may be valid military objectives for attack by virtue of the fact that 
their nature, location, purpose and use makes an effective contribution to 
military capability. In many respects, dual-use objects, by their very nature 
and definition, are not subject to segregating their military value from their 
civilian nature or often from their civilian surroundings. But while Article 
58’s obligations are directed at both dual-use and sole-use military objec-
tives, the above discussion makes clear that there is too much focus on du-
al-use objectives and not enough focus on those that are purely military in 
nature, whether fixed or mobile.  
In cyberspace, State practice, particularly that of the United States, 
makes clear that it is feasible to separate purely military objectives from 
civilian objectives, at least up to a point. The United States military uses 
multiple, dedicated networks to conduct administrative, logistical and oper-
ational activities.50 The three best-known networks are the Non-Classified 
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRnet, which carries information 
classified up to and including Sensitive but Unclassified), Secret Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRnet, which carries data classified up to and 
including the Secret level) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communi-
cation System (JWICS carries data classified up to and including Top Se-
cret/Sensitive Compartmented Information). JWICS and SIPRnet are se-
cure data transmission services, including voice over Internet Protocol ser-
vices used for the transmission of classified information between DoD en-
tities and between DoD and other parts of the U.S. government. Both 
networks are used for transmitting e-mail and web services, and for file 
transfer operations. SIPRnet is the main transmission method for opera-
tional command and control systems, such as the Global Command and 
Control System and the Defense Message Service used to communicate at 
the tactical and strategic levels between DoD commands.      
The NIPRnet is an unclassified data service that uses the Internet Pro-
tocol for connecting to the public Internet. Like the two classified net-
works, the NIPRnet provides a transmission method for e-mail applica-
tions, web services and file transfers. The NIPRnet provides DoD com-
mands and agencies with protected access to the Internet through a limited 
number of controlled Internet access points, or external network gateways. 
Protected, secure access between unclassified networks of DoD agencies, 
non-DoD agencies and departments, and the intelligence community oc-
                                                                                                                      
50. The facts in the next two paragraphs are drawn from the website of the Defense 












curs through NIPRnet Federated Gateways. These two types of gateways 
serve to screen DoD’s unclassified networks from the broader Internet and 
permit implementation of perimeter protection services for DoD networks, 
including the ability to filter web content and provide “secure DoD-wide 
Domain Name Service.”51 These activities serve to create “a clear boundary 
between DoD and others . . . and gives DoD some ability to maneuver at 
the boundary in response to cyber attacks.”52 
Although there are many military objectives (dual-use or otherwise) in 
cyberspace that are inextricably intermingled with civilian cyber objects, as 
has just been illustrated, there is a very substantial core of military cyber-
space activity that occurs on and across dedicated military networks and 
systems. Here we have an intersection with the Tallinn Manual’s Rule 50, 
“Clearly Separated and Distinct Military Objectives,” because these net-
works, most particularly the NIPRnet, present “clearly discrete cyber mili-
tary objectives” even though they are connected to and integrated with 
cyber infrastructure used for civilian purposes. Thus, it is incorrect to char-
acterize the Internet or even large portions of it as “dual-use” simply be-
cause it happens to carry military information alongside and with civilian 
information. In part, this is due to the fact that it is nearly impossible to 
determine the location and military significance of those communications 
at any given moment and concomitantly act against them. With respect to 
targeting U.S. infrastructure, characterizing the Internet as “dual-use” 
would be particularly problematic given the fact that the military networks 
discussed above are available for discrete targeting to achieve the same ob-
jectives. 
For the organization of cyberspace operations, the object lesson is to 
ensure the use of dedicated military networks and systems for cyberspace 
operations that support the operations of a State’s armed forces. Not only 
are such dedicated systems more easily defended, they also present the type 
of clearly separate and distinct military objective properly subject to attack. 
Dedicated military networks serve, therefore, to establish a virtual distinc-
tion akin to the physical separation or relocation that are the type of pre-
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IV. ORGANIZING TO CONDUCT CYBER ATTACK:  
MAKING THE IMPLICIT EXPLICIT 
 
As States organize their forces to conduct cyber attacks, there is a need to 
make explicit that which is currently only implicit in the rules. Namely, that 
cyber attacks—those actions in cyberspace that are proximately intended to 
cause death, injuries or destruction of property—must not, to the maxi-
mum extent feasible, occur from, or be perceived as occurring from, civil-
ian cyberspace objects such that a State responding to such cyber attacks 
would be induced to improperly direct its response against civilian cyber 
objects, whether in the attacking State or another State, rather than legiti-
mate military objects and objectives. In other words, States must take care 
not to misattribute their cyber attacks to otherwise innocent civilian cyber 
objects and must segregate as much as they can the modes of conducting 
cyber attacks from civilian infrastructures. The purpose is to organize in 
such a way as to essentially take precautions against the effects of cyber 
attacks on a State’s own civilian objects and objectives by ensuring they are 
not jeopardized by the manner in which that State conducts its own cyber 
attacks. The remainder of this section will discuss the rules from which this 
formulation is drawn, discuss the practicality of achieving such a solution 
given the previously discussed attributes of cyberspace and also discuss the 
operational practicalities that may result from conducting cyber attacks in 
this manner.   
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I addresses the precautions to be tak-
en by States during the planning and conduct of attacks. Other than the 
first paragraph, however, Article 57 discusses the measures an attacking 
State must take—the principles of distinction and proportionality—with 
respect to the objects of those attacks, with the presumption that such at-
tacks are occurring in the territory of another State. Article 57(1) provides a 
more generic statement applicable to precautions in attack: “In the conduct 
of military operations constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian pop-
ulation, civilians and civilian objects.” The commentary on Article 57 notes 
that this paragraph states a “general principle which imposes an important 
duty on belligerents with respect to civilian populations”53 without distin-
guishing where those civilian populations are located. Here, the implication 
is that the general principle is applicable whether the civilian population is 
                                                                                                                      












located in the State to be attacked, the attacking State or in a third State, 
without regard to whether that State is also a party to the conflict.   
The previous section provided an extensive discussion of precautions 
against the effects of attacks required by Article 58. For purposes of this 
discussion, it should be noted that the requirements of that article refer to 
the precautions to be taken by a State with respect to its own population in 
order to mitigate the effects of attacks from another State. Although the 
text of the article does not directly address the issue presented in this sec-
tion, it is implied in the article’s application to situations involving certain 
types of military objectives, specifically weapons systems. One of the ra-
tionales for requiring, to the extent feasible, that weapons systems not be 
based or located within populated areas is that those particular military ob-
jects will be given a higher priority in targeting by the enemy precisely be-
cause they are the source of a State’s own attacks against that enemy.  
There are a number of customary international law rules that prohibit 
using specially protected places for purposes, such as the initiation of at-
tacks, that would expose those places or objects to destruction or damage. 
For instance, there are well-developed rules against using cultural property 
and places of worship “in support of the military effort.”54 A similar cus-
tomary international law rule is recognized with respect to medical units 
and personnel (including medical aircraft, ambulances and hospitals), 
though it is usually phrased in terms of whether those units are used to 
“commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the ene-
my.”55 As these examples show, the law of armed conflict has long recog-
nized, or at least felt the need to highlight, the need for specifically stated 
prohibitions on the use of certain protected places and personnel in the 
conduct of military operations in a manner that may expose those protect-
ed places and personnel to dangers from attack.  
The lack of a similar specific prohibition on the use of all dedicated 
(not dual-use) civilian objects during the course of military operations may 
seem, at first glance, a surprising oversight. It may well be, though, that to 
the drafters of law of armed conflict treaties, particularly Additional Proto-
col I; there was no need to codify what was likely the most basic matter of 
common sense. After all, Additional Protocol I is replete with formulations 
of customary international law whose base presumption is the duty of State 
parties to protect civilians and civilian objects from the dangers of armed 
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conflict. The commentary on Article 58 even goes so far as to state an ex-
pectation that States “must also cooperate by taking all possible precau-
tions for the benefit of their own population as is in any case in their own 
interest.”56  
Unfortunately, international law has not reached the point at which 
common sense reigns supreme with regard to cyberspace operations. Alt-
hough the United States recognizes the applicability of the law of armed 
conflict to cyberspace operations and there is an emerging consensus 
among academics on this point as demonstrated by the recent publication 
of the Tallinn Manual, not all States share this view and still other States 
view the law of armed conflict’s application as limited in nature, requiring 
new treaty law dedicated to these types of operations. These topics are an 
ongoing subject of discussions between the United States, China, Russia 
and other nations within the Group of Governmental Experts meeting un-
der the auspices of the United Nations. Further complicating these matters, 
while there is a great deal of cyber activity ongoing, with much of it at-
tributed to State actors, there has only been one even arguable instance of a 
cyber attack—the Stuxnet virus that operated against Iranian nuclear cen-
trifuges. Probably, in part, because the Iranians never formally reported the 
results of Stuxnet as a use of force or an armed attack, the authors of the 
Tallinn Manual have even gone so far as to state that “[n]o international 
cyber incidents have, as of 2012, been unambiguously characterised by the 
international community as reaching the threshold of an armed attack.”57  
The custom and practice of States to this point in the cyberspace revo-
lution has been much more focused on conducting espionage and exploita-
tion activities in cyberspace, rather than its use as a means to conduct at-
tacks. Although there is much public speculation about which States are 
behind specific activities, fueled by an increasing forensic competition be-
tween antivirus vendors such as Kaspersky, Symantec and McAfee, these 
activities are occurring in a manner such that they are not attributable to 
the sponsoring State. In his keynote address at the Naval War College’s 
2012 “Cyber War and International Law” conference, Professor Goldsmith 
addressed the characteristics of the cyber problem “that upend the tradi-
tional system,” including the “difficulty of attribution.”58 Similarly, in his 
September, 2012, remarks at the Cyber Command legal conference, Harold 
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Koh, Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State, discussed the chal-
lenges presented by the dual-use nature of the cyberspace environment and 
the difficult technical, policy and legal questions presented by attribution in 
cyberspace.59 At the same time, Koh also downplayed their uniqueness to 
the cyber domain, stating that “[t]hese questions about effects, dual-use 
and attribution are difficult legal and policy questions that existed long be-
fore the development of cyber tools.”60 
Although the non-attributable manner of conducting espionage and 
exploitation activities in cyberspace is instructive as to how States may car-
ry out cyber attacks in the future, it is not necessarily illustrative and should 
not be viewed as dispositive at this point in time. It is one thing to carry 
out espionage and exploitation activities in a manner that intermingles and 
hides among the civilian infrastructure of cyberspace and the Internet. That 
is, after all, exactly how espionage is conducted between nations in the 
physical world, though generally the spies are physically present on the ter-
ritory of the other nation. The ten-member Russian spy ring discovered 
operating in various U.S. East Coast locations in 2010 is but the most re-
cent example.61 
It is quite another thing for States to routinely conduct military opera-
tions that cause death, injury or destruction of property during the course 
of an armed conflict in a manner that is not attributed to the State actor as 
a matter of course. Setting purely domestic considerations aside, as cyber-
space operations move closer and closer to a demonstrated capacity to 
cause the same type of deaths, injury to persons and destruction of proper-
ty as kinetic weapons, there will be substantial pressure on military forces 
to move away from the methodologies of espionage and exploitation in 
carrying out these cyber attacks. This pressure will occur not only because 
of the need to comply with customary international law as embodied in the 
articles of Additional Protocol I discussed earlier, but also because of the 
need for States to accept responsibility for their actions and the actions of 
their armed forces during the course of armed conflict. Again, without any 
available examples of cyber attacks, there is no ability to examine actual 
State practice in this area. This does mean, however, that there remains 
room and opportunity for States to conform their future cyberspace opera-
tions to the need to keep the military sources of their cyber attacks segre-
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gated from civilian cyber infrastructure, always, of course, to the maximum 
extent feasible.  
As with the earlier discussion about precautions against the effects of 
cyber attacks, the question then arises whether it is feasible to conduct 
cyber attacks from a military cyber infrastructure that is segregated from 
civilian cyber infrastructure and possibly attributable as such. Given the 
existence of the dedicated NIPRnet that is virtually segregated from other 
portions of the civilian Internet infrastructure, the question as to feasibility 
of using separate military networks to conduct cyber attacks is an unquali-
fied “yes.” Another solution, relying on a component portion of the 
NIPRnet, was proposed some years ago in an Armed Forces Journal article.62 
 In that article, Colonel Williamson advocated using the af.mil net-
work (the Air Force portion of the NIPRnet) to create a powerful robot 
network of computers (botnet) that could be used to “direct such massive 
amounts of traffic to target computers that they can no longer communi-
cate and become no more useful to our adversaries than hunks of metal 
and plastic.”63 In Williamson’s conception, this ability to “carpet bomb in 
cyberspace” would function as the cyberspace deterrent that the United 
States lacks. Building this botnet could occur by using the Air Force’s exist-
ing servers and computers housing the service’s intrusion detection systems 
or the botnet could be created by re-purposing the thousands of computers 
removed from service every year as part of the Air Force’s annual technol-
ogy refresh program. Those re-purposed computers could then be net-
worked together using botnet software and made to deliver offensive ef-
fects for theater commanders. As the system matures, Williamson envi-
sioned adding .mil machines from other portions of the NIPRnet and pos-
sibly computers from other U.S. government agencies.     
Although such a system (and others like it) is certainly feasible, it may 
not be operationally practicable. For instance, the same Internet access 
points and federated gateways that provide the ability to provide protection 
at the interface with the civilian Internet would act as potential chokepoints 
that are easily mapped. Once known, the access points, as well as the sys-
tem of botnets, may be easily defended against by blocking and filtering by 
an adversary. Williamson acknowledges the technical and engineering chal-
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lenges, but understands that those problems can generally be overcome by 
technical solutions.64  
The issue of operational impracticability raises an interesting issue with 
respect to whether or not a technical solution remains feasible. In such a 
situation, a State would be in the position of declaring that something 
technically feasible is not practicable (and thus not really feasible under the 
law of armed conflict) because the State has a preferred way of conducting 
its operations. Though the law of armed conflict provides no ready answer 
to this dilemma, one of the key considerations is likely to be how much 
effort the State undertook to overcome the technical problems causing the 
operational impracticability. In addition, to the extent that the State choos-
es not to explore the feasibility of conducting cyber attacks from a segre-
gated military cyber infrastructure, but instead conducts its military opera-
tions in a manner that intentionally intermingles those operations with ci-
vilian cyber infrastructure, problems would arise under the law of armed 




As States organize for military operations in cyberspace, particularly the 
conducting of cyber attacks during the course of armed conflicts, they must 
remain fully cognizant of the burdens imposed by the law of armed con-
flict. Properly interpreted and applied, the law of armed conflict supplies 
the answers to many questions that will arise during the course of preparing 
to conduct cyberspace operations. The Tallinn Manual on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare is an important contribution to the effort of 
addressing these questions. More importantly, the Manual provides a set of 
answers that is consistent in its viewpoint and approach, one that takes a 
cautious, yet prudent approach largely by analogy, in an area where very 
little State practice exists or is apparent.  
As States conduct the legal reviews of cyber weapons required by the 
law of armed conflict, the example of U.S. practice is instructive. States 
should not follow the lead of the U.S. Air Force by requiring legal reviews 
of all cyber capabilities, but only those cyber capabilities whose intended 
effect or result is death, injury or destruction of property, the standard fol-
lowed by the Army and the naval services.  














When examining the precautions to be taken against the effects of 
cyber attacks, it is feasible to create—and easier to defend—dedicated mili-
tary networks in an effort to establish separation, even if it is only virtual in 
nature, from a State’s civilian cyber infrastructure.  Likewise, cyberspace 
operations present unique challenges that, if not prepared for appropriately, 
will serve to further increase the risks to a country’s innocent civilian cyber 
infrastructure if it executes cyber attacks from infrastructure that is inter-
mingled with, and not segregated from, civilian cyber infrastructure. It is 
technically feasible to conduct cyber attacks in a manner that does not 
place civilian cyber infrastructure in increased jeopardy of attack. This area 
of the law of armed conflict is sure to come under additional scrutiny as 
States move closer to executing cyber attacks for which they accept re-
sponsibility during armed conflicts.  
 
